I Introduction
Information asymmetry deals with the study of decisions in transactions where one stakeholder has access to more or better information than the other. The theoretical foundation for an understanding of the rural credit markets in developing countries is provided by information asymmetry prevailing in these markets. A large number of studies of India and other developing countries before the nineties demonstrated that there is imperfect information in the rural credit markets where most of the institutional lenders were not endowed with the borrower's credit history. Thus, the problem of screening of incentives and enforcement turned out to be one major contributory factor restricting the share of the institutional credit in these markets.
The situation has significantly changed since then. India has witnessed significant changes in the rural credit markets in the past two decades. Rural banks are now equipped to screen their customers with better access to the borrower's credit profile which includes details of land titles, assets, trade-credit linkages, fellow guarantees, and the history of transactions and defaults The
